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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that even those ﬁrms presumably most in need
of monitoring-intensive ﬁnancing (young, small, and innovative ﬁrms) have
a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of
relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the
economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank
ﬁnancing.
To ﬁll this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that
allows for multiple but asymmetric bank ﬁnancing. The optimal debt
structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple
lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show
that ﬁrms with low expected cash-ﬂows or high asset speciﬁcity prefer
asymmetric ﬁnancing, while ﬁrms with high expected cash-ﬂow or high
asset speciﬁcity tend to ﬁnance without relationship bank.
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frankfurt.de1 Introduction
The vices and virtues of bank debt ﬁnancing seem nowadays rather well under-
stood. The existence of a bank lender, who is able to renegotiate debt contracts
and acquires private information appears to be optimal in particular for infor-
mationally opaque borrowers: Close ties between a bank and its debtor provide
incentives for information production and monitoring, enable (eﬃcient) renegoti-
ation of contracts, and allow for intertemporal transfers. This may constitute a ﬁ-
nancing arrangement otherwise not (or only more costly) available to ﬁrms. This
concept is characterized as relationship lending (Mayer (1988), Sharpe (1990),
Rajan (1992), Boot (2000)), and it is usually presumed to be based on exclu-
sivity: the relationship lender is the only bank providing debt to the ﬁrm. The
dark side of such a relationship is also well known: If the relationship bank can
renegotiate contracts and the borrower is tied to the bank, this gives rise to a
certain degree of monopoly power and therefore the potential ability of the bank
to extract rents. If this hold-up problem is too severe, theory predicts the choice
of a multitude of (equal) lenders, thereby reducing their bargaining power and
avoiding the renegotiation of debt contracts (Dewatripont and Maskin (1995),
von Thadden (1992)).1
However, empirical evidence suggests that this story is not able to explain an
important feature of observed capital structures: Even those ﬁrms mostly in need
of monitoring-intensive debt ﬁnancing (young, small, and innovative ﬁrms) quite
generally have a multitude of bank lenders. Thus, single bank ﬁnancing is an
exception rather than the rule (Ongena and Smith (2001), Detragiache, Garella,
and Guiso (2000)). Does this suggest that relationship lending is a neat concept
without consequences for the real world? Recent empirical evidence renders such
a conclusion to be premature because it shows that multiple bank ﬁnancing can
co-exist with the presence of one bank ﬁnancier which is special. This implies
asymmetry in multiple bank ﬁnancing of ﬁrms. For example, Petersen and Rajan
(1994) report for the NSSBF small ﬁrm sample in the U.S. that, depending on
ﬁrm size, the largest bank lender of a ﬁrm has an average ﬁnancing share between
1von Thadden (1995) shows that using long-term debt contracts with speciﬁc features can
circumvent the hold-up problem without the need for multiple bank relationships.
195% and 76%, while the number of lenders ranges from just above one up to three.
Elsas (2004) shows that the relationship lender of a medium-sized German ﬁrm
(the so-called Hausbank) contributes on average 44% of borrower debt ﬁnancing,
although the borrower maintains on average 4.4 bank relationships.
Hence, another type of relationship lending seems to exist, which can be char-
acterized as multiple but asymmetric bank ﬁnancing, where a pivotal bank with
an informational privilege and bargaining power exists jointly with less informed
”arm’s-length” banks. Unfortunately, economic theory does not have to say a
lot why relationship lending may be an optimal debt ﬁnancing instrument in the
context of multiple bank ﬁnancing. The objective of this paper is to make a ﬁrst
step towards ﬁlling this theoretical void. We develop a simple framework where
multiple but asymmetric bank ﬁnancing may arise as an optimal ﬁnancing choice.
In our model, an entrepreneur seeks to ﬁnance an ex ante proﬁtable invest-
ment project. The entrepreneur can choose between three ﬁnancing structures:
Single bank ﬁnancing with bargaining power for this relationship bank, ﬁnancing
by a multitude of equal and individually small banks (arm’s-length banks), or
ﬁnancing by a mixture of both, i.e. multiple but asymmetric banks. In the latter
case, there exists one pivotal bank with a high ﬁnancing share and bargaining
power. These two characteristics are essential elements of the relationship lending
notion, but in a situation of multiple bank ﬁnancing.
The fundamental problem of ﬁnancing results from uncertainty about the
project’s outcome, the banks right to withdraw funds at an interim stage, and
the complementarity of their decisions. A bank must take into account other
banks withdrawal decisions since reﬁnancing withdrawn debt is costly.2 This
leads to strategic uncertainty and the risk of coordination failure, because there
exist some values of the project’s outcome where a ﬁrm may fail its obligations
only because too many lenders withdraw at the interim stage.
Our main contributions are as follows. First, we show that under some condi-
tions the co-existence of arm’s-length and relationship ﬁnancing can endogenously
be the optimal ﬁnancing choice of ﬁrms for two reasons: i) The joint ﬁnancing
from small banks and one relationship lender balances the relationship lender’s
2In an extended version of the model the bank must also take into account private signals
about borrower quality.
2bargaining power and debt forgiveness, even without coordination risk regard-
ing the small banks’ withdrawal decisions. ii) When small banks’ decisions are
subject to the risk of coordination failure, ﬁnancing from a relationship lender be-
comes more beneﬁcial (ceteris paribus). Small banks will orientate their decisions
not only on the strategic interaction with other small banks but on the expected
behavior of the pivotal bank as well.3 The large bank also reduces the impact of
small banks’ coordination failure. Overall, an asymmetric ﬁnancing structure is
particularly beneﬁcial for risky ﬁrms or for ﬁrms with high asset speciﬁcity.
Second, instead of pointing to the relevance of the number of bank lenders
as the key issue in multiple lending, we show that asymmetry in the relative
importance (i.e. the ﬁnancing shares) of banks in lending might also be essential.
We thus complement the literature on multiple bank lending by analyzing lender
concentration.
Finally, we show that the association between the importance of the relation-
ship lender and the liquidation value of assets (i.e. collateral) is non-monotonic.
This can explain the ambiguity in empirical ﬁndings with respect to relationship
lending and loan collateralization.
Of course, previous literature provides theoretical arguments for the beneﬁts
of multiple bank lending. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Bolton and Scharf-
stein (1996) show that multiple bank ﬁnancing leads to a hard budget constraint
for the borrower. In the latter model, a larger number of ﬁnancing banks com-
plicates debt renegotiation in case of default. This reduces borrower incentives
for strategic default, but decreases ﬁrm value in case of true liquidity default.
The optimal capital structure balances both eﬀects.4 Detragiache, Garella, and
Guiso (2000) show that multiple lending can also be beneﬁcial because diversiﬁca-
tion reduces the likelihood that borrower ﬁnancing is terminated due to liquidity
3Pagratis (2002) analyzes the role of banks in facilitating public debt exchange oﬀers when
asymmetric creditors face coordination problems. In resolving ﬁnancial distress of the ﬁrm, he
shows that the large creditor’s actions allow small creditors to coordinate better. However, in
contrast to our work the existence of a large lender and many small creditors is just assumed.
4In a related model, Welch and Bris (2001) conjecture that a larger number of creditors
increases the costs of enforcing lender claims in ﬁnancial distress. This might be balanced
against more eﬃcient continuation decisions in ﬁnancial distress by more concentrated lenders,
but this is not explicitly modelled.
3shocks to the lenders. Carletti (2004) analyzes multiple banking if banks endoge-
nously determine their degree of borrower monitoring, but monitoring represents
a public good and exhibits economies of scale. The optimal lending structure
then balances monitoring beneﬁts (i.e. better project quality) against the cost of
duplicated eﬀort. Finally, multiple bank lending may be used to reduce bargain-
ing power of lenders to weaken the hold-up problem, as in von Thadden (1992)
and just recently Hubert and Sch¨ afer (2002). Our model is mostly related to this
type of explanation.
A salient feature of all of the aforementioned models is that lenders generally
are presumed to have equal shares in borrower ﬁnancing. Complementing these
papers, our model analyzes the optimal concentration of debt ﬁnancing from
banks with and without the ability to renegotiate loan contracts.
Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1997) show that only a fraction of funds needs to
be ﬁnanced by a relationship lender to deter the borrower from moral hazard.
The remaining funds can be raised from passive investors like the market or
uninformed arm’s-length banks. In contrast, in our model the small lenders have
an active role in that they can withdraw ﬁnancing at an interim stage. Hence,
we complement Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1997) because our small investors truly
resemble banks, which can actively make decisions that aﬀect the borrower and
the relationship lender.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model’s setup. We lay out the basic framework and characterize the ﬁnancing
problem of the borrower regarding its choice of debt structure. Further, we
discuss the coordination problem of bank lenders. In Section 3 we derive the
optimal ﬁnancing structure. In Section 4, we examine comparative statics to
derive empirical implications. In Section 5 we discuss an extension of our model,
allowing for asymmetric information between lenders. Section 6 concludes.
42 Relationship Lending with Multiple Banks and
Asymmetry: A Stylized Model
2.1 Basic Framework
The objective of our model is to explore conditions where multiple but asymmetric
bank lending occurs as an optimal capital structure choice of a ﬁrm. We consider
two types of bank ﬁnancing: a relationship bank (”large lender” for simplicity)
and arm’s-length banks (”small lenders”). A relationship bank may renegotiate
loans, thereby earning positive ex post rents in good states of the world, or
forgive debt in bad states of the world. Small ”arm’s-length” bank lenders, in
turn, cannot renegotiate loan contract terms. However, all lenders resemble banks
in that they can withdraw ﬁnancing at an interim stage.
Small lenders each have an equal and small share in total small lender ﬁnanc-
ing. As is standard, we assume for simplicity that the number of small lenders
approaches inﬁnity. This simpliﬁes the analysis without making any diﬀerence
regarding the strategic behavior of small lenders (see e.g. Morris and Shin (2001)
and Hubert and Sch¨ afer (2002)).
We incorporate these features in an extension of the model by Hubert and
Sch¨ afer (2002). The timing is as follows (the timeline is also depicted in Figure
1):
0. The ﬁrm tries to raise debt to ﬁnance an investment project with uncertain
cash ﬂows θ. The ﬁrm decides on the size of the large lender, λ ∈ [0, 1]. It
oﬀers a contractual debt repayment D.
1. Banks decide whether or not to borrow to the ﬁrm. This leads to partici-
pation constraints in the choice of λ,D.
2. Information about cash ﬂow θ becomes uncovered. In the standard model,
we assume perfect information of all lenders (and the ﬁrm). Eﬀects of
imperfect and private signals are discussed as a model extension in Section
5.
3. All lenders simultaneously decide whether to extend ﬁnancing, or withdraw
credit receiving an early liquidation value K. In addition, the large lender
5renegotiates the debt repayment and sets D∗. For reasons of simplicity,
we assume that the large lender has full bargaining power and extracts
all proﬁts subject to outside options of the ﬁrm. Small lenders cannot
renegotiate their debt contracts.
4. The ﬁrm decides on investing eﬀort V in the project. If it does, it has to
reﬁnance withdrawn debt.
5. Realization of cash ﬂows and payments. If the ﬁrm did invest and reﬁnance,
the project is successful with cash ﬂow θ and debt contracts are paid oﬀ. If
the ﬁrm did not invest V , the project fails. The ﬁnal liquidation value of
the remaining assets is normalized to zero.
Figure 1: Timeline of the Model
Debt contracts 
are signed (D, λ )
Information on θ  uncovered
•Lenders decide on continuation.
• Lenders may withdraw and receive K.
•Firm decides on effort V.
•Refinancing of withdrawn debt.
Payments are settled
1
2
3
4
5
The initial investment is normalized to 1. The interim (non-pecuniary and
non-contractible) investment by the ﬁrm in t=4 serves to establish an incentive
problem, and one may think of the interim investment as eﬀort to manage the
project successfully.
The project is characterized by the prior distribution of cash ﬂow and by its
liquidation value. If V is invested and the project carried out until the end, the
project generates cash ﬂow θ in t=5 which is uniformly distributed on the interval
[µ − τ, µ+ τ]. µ is the ex ante expected cash–ﬂow of the project, to which we
refer sometimes as project quality. The density of θ is given by
f(θ)=



1
2τ if µ − τ<θ<µ+ τ
0e l s e
(1)
The variance is Va r(θ)=1
3τ2. The uniform distribution is assumed for analytical
tractability. However, the economic rationale behind our results is independent
from the precise shape of the distribution of cash–ﬂow.
6Lenders are allowed to decide on continuation of ﬁnancing or withdrawal at
the interim stage t=3. The ﬁrm can reﬁnance if lenders withdraw. For small
lenders the cost of reﬁnancing are denoted by W per unit of capital. For the
large lender the cost of reﬁnancing is W ∗ ≥ W. Hence, the ﬁrm faces switching
costs of changing lenders. This assumption serves for two purposes. First, it is
a stylized way of establishing bargaining power for the large lender (but not for
small ones). While the large lender can use his knowledge about W ∗ and θ at
the interim stage to renegotiate the loan contract, small lenders must stick to
the ex ante agreed on loan contract terms. Second, the fact that the withdrawal
of each lender increases ﬁnancing costs establishes complementarity of lenders’
strategies.
Lenders simultaneously decide on credit continuation. A lender who with-
draws at the interim stage receives a liquidation value of K per unit of capital.
We assume that K does not diﬀer for large and small lenders. We provide a more
detailed analysis of the role of such ”collateral” in Section 4.
2.2 Credit Extension
In order to derive the optimal ﬁnancing of the ﬁrm, it is useful to characterize
some essential model features and provide some deﬁnitions up-front. In partic-
ular, we ﬁrst discuss interaction of the ﬁrm and its creditors, if debt contracts
(λ,D) are already ﬁxed.
The ﬁrm’s decision
At t = 4, the ﬁrm decides on spending eﬀort V . If it does, it has to reﬁ-
nance withdrawn credit from stage 3, where creditors decided on continuation or
withdrawal. If it does not, the project fails. The ﬁrm’s decision depends on θ
and on the fraction of small lenders that terminated credit supply, denoted by T.
Further, the ﬁrm must also reﬁnance the large lender if he decided for withdrawal.
Suppose a fraction T ∈ [0,1] of small lenders withdraws credit. Reﬁnancing
small lenders’ credits costs W per unit. Reﬁnancing the large lender’s credit costs
W ∗ per unit. We assume D>K ,a n dW ∗ ≥ W>D . In addition, we assume
that µ − τ<V+ K and µ + τ>V+ W ∗, i.e. the support of θ is suﬃciently
7large. This guarantees that in worst cases, cash ﬂow is so low that it is ineﬃcient
to reﬁnance the ﬁrm in stage 3. In best cases, however, cash ﬂow is suﬃcient to
cover costs of a single large lender and leave some proﬁts to the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm’s
decision can now be characterized as follows.
If the large lender extends credit and the ﬁrm puts eﬀort in stage 4, its payoﬀ
is
πF = θ − V − λD
∗ − (1 − λ)(1− T)D − (1 − λ)TW .
If the large lender withdraws, the ﬁrm reﬁnances and puts eﬀort in the project,
its payoﬀ is
πF = θ − V − λW
∗ − (1 − λ)(1− T)D − (1 − λ)TW .
Finally, if the ﬁrm puts no more eﬀort in the project at stage 4, its payoﬀ is zero,
since all remaining assets are seized by the creditors. In the subgame starting at
t=4 the ﬁrm puts in eﬀort, if net proﬁts πF are non-negative. This constitutes
an incentive constraint for the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm’s behavior at this stage depends on creditor decisions at t=3, i.e. the
coordination of credit extension. Creditors decide on continuation or withdrawal
of credits. They must take into account i) the strategies of the other lenders,
ii) the ﬁrm’s incentive to spend eﬀort in t=4, and iii) their information on θ.
The lenders’ payoﬀs can be characterized as follows. A small lender gets K if he
withdraws. He gets D if he extends and the ﬁrm is successful and 0 if the ﬁrm
fails. The large lender gets K if he withdraws. He gets D∗ if he extends and the
ﬁrm is successful and zero if the ﬁrm fails.
For simplicity, we assume perfect information of all players. Decisions of
lenders whether to extend or withdraw credits depend on θ, which is uncovered
at t=2, i.e. after debt contracts have been signed. In any equilibrium, the
proportion of withdrawn credits is a function T(θ).
The large lender’s decision
D∗ is determined by the renegotiation process between the ﬁrm and the large
lender and also depends on θ. If negotiations fail, the large lender can withdraw
credit and gets K per unit of capital. Ex post eﬃcient negotiations succeed,
8whenever proﬁtability θ is large enough to cover a repayment of at least K to the
large lender,
θ ≥ V + λK+( 1− λ)[ T(θ)W +( 1− T(θ))D]. (2)
One can distinguish two extreme cases from the point of view of the large lender.
In the worst case, all small lenders withdraw credit, T(θ) = 1. This deﬁnes a
failure point, θ, below which the project is terminated since θ is not suﬃcient to
pay lenders and provide incentives for the ﬁrm to invest eﬀort.
¯ θ = V + λK+( 1− λ)W. (3)
In the best case for the large lender, all small lenders extend credit, T(θ)=0 .
This deﬁnes another critical failure point below which the project is terminated,
labeled θ.
θ = V + λK+( 1− λ)D. (4)
Both equations illustrate a crucial characteristic of multiple but asymmetric
lending. Failure points are decreasing in the size of the large lender since K<D .
This reﬂects the beneﬁt of a large lender to forgive debt in bad states of the
world.
For θ<θ , we get a unique equilibrium with all creditors withdrawing credit.
For θ>¯ θ, there is a unique equilibrium with all creditors extending credit. In
the intermediate region [θ, ¯ θ], there are two equilibria for each element, one at
which creditors extend credit and one where they all withdraw.
As is standard for coordination games, in this case we end up with multiple
equilibria in this subgame. Credit extension is eﬃcient, whenever θ>θand this
equilibrium Pareto–dominates the coexisting equilibrium of withdrawal. There
is strategic uncertainty, though, and there is no reason to expect that lenders
act according to Pareto–eﬃciency. Various reﬁnement theories deﬁne diﬀerent
thresholds.5 To understand the impact of coordination risk on optimal ﬁnancing,
we focus the analysis on two extreme situations: eﬃcient coordination and (most)
ineﬃcient coordination, i.e. maximin strategies that are associated with the
ineﬃcient failure point ¯ θ. As will be discussed in Section 5, allowing for noisy
and private signals leads to a unique equilibrium in between these two extremes.
5For a discussion of theoretical reﬁnements and experimental evidence see Heinemann (2002).
92.2.1 Eﬃcient Coordination of Small Lenders
Assume ﬁrst that credits are extended whenever this is eﬃcient. In this situation,
there is no coordination risk. Nevertheless, having small lenders is associated with
beneﬁts and opportunity costs for the ﬁrm. First, the large lender participates
in better states of the world and extracts surplus from the ﬁrm, i.e. the hold-up
problem. But on the other hand, he is willing to soften the budget constraint and
continue debt provision in some lower states of the world. At the critical state θ,
cash ﬂow is just suﬃcient to cover the costs of paying face value of debt D to all
small lenders and an amount K to the large lender. But, since the large lender
has full bargaining power he extracts all proﬁts up to the point, where switching
the large creditor (at costs W ∗) is an alternative for the ﬁrm. This happens at
ˆ θ = V + λW
∗ +( 1− λ)D>θ . (5)
At this point, cash ﬂow is suﬃcient to pay face value to small creditors and to
reﬁnance the large credit. Note that ˆ θ is increasing in the size of the large lender.
For θ<θ , the ﬁrm is liquidated, for θ <θ<ˆ θ, the ﬁrm is continued, but all
proﬁts are extracted by the large lender, and only for θ>ˆ θ, the ﬁrm earns the
cash ﬂow exceeding ˆ θ.
For θ being uniformly distributed in [µ−τ,µ+τ], expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm
are given by
E(πF)=
1
2τ
  µ+τ
ˆ θ
 
θ − ˆ θ
 
dθ =
1
4τ
 
µ + τ − ˆ θ
 2
=
1
4τ
[µ + τ − V − W
∗ +( 1− λ)(W
∗ − D)]
2 . (6)
From (6) one can see that expected proﬁts are decreasing in the size of the
large lender λ. ˆ θ is increasing in λ,t h u sλ reduces the set of states, in which
the ﬁrm earns positive proﬁts. Furthermore, in all of these states proﬁts are
decreasing with rising λ, that is, in the smaller interval proﬁts will also be lower.
The large lender is helpful in continuing the project in states where continuation
is eﬃcient (cash ﬂows of the project are higher than the liquidation value), but
he reaps all the beneﬁts. Accordingly, conditional on D being ﬁxed (and ignoring
participation constraints of lenders), a ﬁrm cannot beneﬁt from having large
lender in the case of eﬃcient coordination. However, as we will see in Section 3
10below, an optimal debt structure takes participation constraints into account and
determines D endogenously. Since the large lender bears risk for the small lenders
due to his debt forgiveness in bad states, asymmetric ﬁnancing can nevertheless
be the ﬁrm’s best choice.
2.2.2 Ineﬃcient Coordination of Small Lenders
As an alternative, let us now consider that small lenders coordinate on the most
ineﬃcient equilibrium and withdraw credits for all states θ<¯ θ. This introduces
the maximum coordination risk and forces the ﬁrm to reﬁnance withdrawn funds
at costs W per unit capital to continue the project.
At state ¯ θ, cash ﬂow is just suﬃcient to reﬁnance small lenders’ credits and to
pay an amount K to the large lender. ¯ θ is the threshold to failure. The threshold
above which the ﬁrm earns positive proﬁts is ˆ θ, provided that this exceeds ¯ θ.
From the deﬁnitions of these terms, we ﬁnd that
ˆ θ ≤ ¯ θ ⇔ λ ≤ ˆ λ =
W − D
W − D + W ∗ − K
. (7)
Note that ˆ λ<1. If the large lender is suﬃciently small, i.e. for λ<ˆ λ,h e
can never extract all proﬁts from the ﬁrm. In all states in which the project is
continued, its cash ﬂow exceeds the costs of replacing the large lender. In lower
states, θ<¯ θ, cash ﬂow does not suﬃce to replace small lenders, even when the
large lender requires only K.
Expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm are now given by
E(πF)=
1
2τ
  µ+τ
max{ˆ θ,¯ θ}
(θ − ˆ θ)dθ. (8)
With increasing λ, the two thresholds ˆ θ and ¯ θ move in opposite directions. If
λ>ˆ λ, any further increase reduces the set of states, in which the ﬁrm earns pos-
itive proﬁts and it lowers these proﬁts when they occur. Conditional on D being
ﬁxed, the optimal size of the large lender is smaller than ˆ λ and balances marginal
losses due to the hold-up problem with marginal gains from the positive eﬀect
that λ has on the default point due to ineﬃcient coordination of small lenders.
When the size of the large credit is small, the coordination eﬀect dominates the
hold-up problem.
11To illustrate the role of λ, Figure 2 shows the proﬁt of the ﬁrm (πF)i na
situation where λ<ˆ λ or equivalently ˆ θ<¯ θ.A n i n c r e a s e i n λ shifts ¯ θ1 to ¯ θ2
and ˆ θ1 to ˆ θ2. If the ﬁrm is continued, bargaining power allows the large lender
to extract some proﬁts from the ﬁrm. The amount that can be extracted is
increasing in λ. This lowers state-contingent proﬁts of the ﬁrm. The eﬀect of λ
on continuation of the project is positive, however. Raising λ reduces the failure
point ¯ θ and increases the set of states in which the ﬁrm earns proﬁts. The optimal
size of the large lender balances the two eﬀects.
Figure 2: Eﬀects of Raising λ on Critical States and Firm Proﬁts
The ﬁgure illustrates the impact of the large lender’s ﬁnancing share λ on the
critical thresholds θ when the coordination eﬀect dominates the hold-up problem.
¯ θ reﬂects the critical ﬁrm quality where coordination of small lenders lead to the
continuation of ﬁrm ﬁnancing, ˆ θ reﬂects the maximum point of rent extraction by
the large lender. An increase in λ shifts ¯ θ1 to ¯ θ2 and ˆ θ1 to ˆ θ2. Ceteris paribus, the
bargaining power of the large lender increases lowering state-contingent proﬁts
of the ﬁrm. However, raising λ reduces the failure point ¯ θ and increases the set
of states in which the ﬁrm earns proﬁts. The optimal size of the large lender
balances the two eﬀects.
θ
π
1 θ ˆ
π F θ   θ   θ ˆ θ ≥ ∀ − =
1 θ 2 θ 2 θ ˆ
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Using these insights, we can derive the optimal size of a relationship lender
conditional on ﬁxed D.
Theorem 1 Under ineﬃcient coordination of small lenders and for given loan
contracts with repayment D, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximizing ﬁnancing structure is
asymmetric, i.e. 0 <λ ∗ < 1, if and only if µ+τ<V+W +
(W−K)(W−D)
W∗−D .T h e n ,
12the optimal size of the large lender is
λ
∗ =
(W − K)(W − D) − (W ∗ − D)[µ + τ − V − W]
(W − K)[2W ∗ + W − 2D − K]
.
Otherwise, λ∗ =0 .
Proof : To derive the optimal size of the relationship bank, we maximize
expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm, using our knowledge that the optimal λ will be lower
than ˆ λ. Then, expected proﬁts are
E(πF)=
1
2τ
  µ+τ
ˆ θ
(θ − ˆ θ)dθ =
1
2τ
 
(µ + τ)2 − ¯ θ2
2
− (µ + τ) ˆ θ + ˆ θ ¯ θ
 
.
Using the deﬁnitions of ˆ θ and ¯ θ, we get the derivative
∂E(πF)
∂λ
=
1
2τ
 
(W − K)(ˆ θ − ¯ θ) − (W
∗ − D)(µ + τ − ¯ θ)
 
. (9)
Setting the derivative equal to zero gives the proﬁt maximizing λ∗,p r o v i d e d
that it is non–negative. λ∗ depends on µ and τ. Inserting ˆ θ and ¯ θ in (9) and
solving
∂E(πF)
∂λ = 0 for λ gives
⇔ λ
∗ =
(W − K)(W − D) − (W ∗ − D)[µ + τ − V − W]
(W − K)[2W ∗ + W − 2D − K]
(10)
λ∗ is smaller than ˆ λ. It is decreasing in µ + τ and increasing in V .
λ∗ is positive, if and only if
µ + τ<V+ W +
(W − K)(W − D)
W ∗ − D
QED
This constitutes some ﬁrst results in a situation with coordination risk: Hav-
ing a large lender can be beneﬁcial. λ∗, the optimal size of the large lender is
decreasing in µ+τ. For suﬃciently good projects or for a suﬃcient intermediate
liquidation value K, ﬁnancing does not require a large lender. The lower µ + τ,
the larger is λ∗, but it remains below ˆ λ and is, thereby, always smaller than one.
133 The Optimal Debt Structure
The analysis in the preceding section treated the promised repayment of debt con-
tracts, D, as an exogenous variable. Of course, this ignores lenders’ participation
constraints.
This aspect is of utmost importance, because the size of the large lender does
not only aﬀect ﬁrm’s proﬁts but lenders’ proﬁts as well. The larger the size of
the relationship bank, the larger is the set of states in which the project succeeds
and small credits are payed oﬀ. Thereby, relationship lending increases expected
payoﬀs of small lenders or, alternatively, reduces the risk premium that is included
in the repayment D.
Optimal ﬁnancing requires the ﬁrm to choose parameters D and λ in t=0 that
maximize expected proﬁts, subject to the participation constraints of all lenders.
In principle, there are four possible outcomes:
1. The project cannot be ﬁnanced because no type of lender is willing to
provide credit ex ante.
2. The project is ﬁnanced only by small lenders (λ∗ =0 ) .
3. The project is ﬁnanced only by the large lender (λ∗ =1 ) .
4. The project is ﬁnanced asymmetrically by both the large and small lenders
(0 <λ ∗ < 1).
We are most interested in those cases, where multiple but asymmetric lending
occurs as the optimal capital structure, i.e. the interior solution of case 4.
3.1 Optimal Debt Structure with Eﬃcient Coordination
With perfect information and eﬃcient coordination, credits will be extended
whenever θ ≥ θ.
Firm’s expected proﬁts
The ﬁrm earns θ − ˆ θ whenever that is positive. As shown in Section 2.2,
expected proﬁts, E(πF), are given by (6):
E(πF)=
1
2τ
  µ+τ
ˆ θ
 
θ − ˆ θ
 
dθ =
1
4τ
[µ + τ − V − W
∗ +( 1− λ)(W
∗ − D)]
2 .
14The ﬁrm chooses λ and D such that expected proﬁts are maximized. The
ﬁrm’s participation requires E(πF) ≥ 0. Expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm are decreas-
ing in λ and D. Iso–proﬁt–curves are concave with slope dλ
dD =
−(1−λ)
W∗−D.
Small Lenders’ Participation
Small lenders get D if θ ≥ θ and K otherwise. Using the uniform distribution
of θ, small lenders’ expected proﬁts per unit of capital are
E(πS)=K +( D − K)prob(θ>θ )=K +( D − K)
µ + τ − θ
2τ
. (11)
Small lenders’ participation requires E(πS) ≥ R,w h e r eR ≥ 1r e p r e s e n t st h e
opportunity costs of capital. Since θ is decreasing in λ, small lenders’ expected
proﬁts are rising in the size of the relationship lender. Hence, participation of
small lenders may require the existence of a relationship lender who takes a
suﬃciently large part of the debt. E(πS) ≥ R is equivalent to
λ>λ S =
2τ (R − K) − (D − K)[µ + τ − V − D]
(D − K)2 . (12)
Large Lender’s Participation
For λ units of capital provided, the large lender gets λW ∗ whenever θ>ˆ θ (the
region for which the ﬁrm makes proﬁts), and λK if θ<θ(the ﬁrm is liquidated).
Participation requires E(πL) ≥ λR. Thus, eliminating λ yields payoﬀs per unit
of capital.
In intermediate states θ <θ<ˆ θ, the large lender extracts all proﬁts out of
the ﬁrm. Here, the payoﬀ per unit of capital invested by the large lender is
πL =
θ − V − (1 − λ)D
λ
. (13)
Prior expected proﬁts of the large lender are then equal to
E(πL)=K prob(θ<θ )+
  ˆ θ
θ
θ − V − (1 − λ)D
2τλ
dθ + W
∗ prob(θ>ˆ θ)
= K +
µ + τ − V − (1 − λ)D − λ W∗+K
2
2τ
. (14)
The large lender’s participation requires E(πL) ≥ R, which is equivalent to
λ ≤ λL =
µ + τ − V − D −
2τ (R−K)
W∗−K
W∗+K
2 − D
if D<
W ∗ + K
2
(15)
15and
λ ≥ λL if D>
W ∗ + K
2
.
The term W∗+K
2 represents the average payoﬀ per unit of capital that the
large lender receives in intermediate states θ <θ<ˆ θ.I n c r e a s i n gλ extends the
set of intermediate states by raising ˆ θ and reducing θ.I fD<W∗+K
2 ,a ni n c r e a s e
of λ has a larger eﬀect on ˆ θ than on θ. This reduces the expected payoﬀ for the
large lender. If D>W∗+K
2 ,a ni n c r e a s eo fλ has the opposite eﬀect.
Optimal debt contract
Combining the participation constraints of both types of lenders deﬁnes the
set of contracts (λ,D) from which the ﬁrm can choose. Expected proﬁts of the
ﬁrm are given by (6). They are decreasing in λ and D. Iso–proﬁt–curves are
concave with slope dλ
dD =
−(1−λ)
W∗−D.
Maximizing expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm with respect to the lenders’ participa-
tion constraints requires to consider several distinct cases. The optimal ﬁnancing
structure depends on the diﬀerence R − K and on other exogenous parameters.
The precise solution is analyzed in Appendix A. Here, we only give the general
results.
Theorem 2 a) The ﬁrm can be ﬁnanced if and only if
R − K<
W ∗ − K
2τ
 
µ + τ − V −
W ∗ + K
2
 
≡ L
C.
b) The ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by a single large lender (λ =1 ), if and only if
L1 ≡
W − K
2τ
(µ + τ − V − K) ≤ R − K ≤ L
C.
This case requires W ∗ − W and µ + V to be suﬃciently large.
c) For each combination of µ,τ,V,K,W,W ∗ that fulﬁlls the basic assumptions
of our model, there is an interval [L, ¯ L] with non–empty interior, such that for
L <R− K<¯ L the optimal ﬁnancing structure is asymmetric, i.e. 0 <λ<1.
Note that ¯ L = min{L1,L C}.
d) For suﬃciently low R − K, the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by small lenders only
(λ =0 ).
e) The critical values of R−K at which the ﬁnancing structure changes (LC,
L1, ¯ L, L), are monotonically increasing in µ and decreasing in V .
16The proof is given in Appendix A. Note that the expression R − K can be
interpreted as loss given default from the banks’ perspective and, therefore, rep-
resents one dimension of credit risk. Also it reﬂects the speciﬁcity of ﬁrm assets,
with lower liquidation values at the interim stage the more speciﬁc the assets.
Figure 3: Optimal Financing Structure under Eﬃcient Coordination
The ﬁgure illustrates Theorem 2 and shows feasible regions of the optimal ﬁnanc-
ing structure, λ∗∗, with eﬃcient coordination of small lenders. Fixed parameters
equal K =0 .8, W =1 .4, W∗ =1 .6, V =0 .4, and τ =1 .
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Figure 3 illustrates Theorem 2 using a generic combination of parameters and
showing the implied optimal ﬁnancing structures. For any combination of W ∗,
W, K, µ, τ and V we ﬁnd that (i) the ﬁrm cannot be ﬁnanced if R − K is
suﬃciently large (with the critical boundary LC), (ii) there is some R−K below
which the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by small lenders only (with the critical boundary L),
and (iii) there is an intermediate range for R−K, in which the optimal ﬁnancing
structure is asymmetric ([L, ¯ L]). In the upper right corner of the ﬁgure, one can
see that pure relationship ﬁnancing, λ = 1, occurs only for the speciﬁc situation
where parameters are such that L1 ≤ R − K ≤ LC. We would like to emphasize
that for R−K = LC <L 1 the ﬁrm will choose an asymmetric ﬁnancing structure,
i.e. λ is bound below 1, even when the ﬁrm is on the edge of being ﬁnanced.
Figure 4 depicts a typical situation of an interior solution for a project of
17lower quality and intermediate opportunity costs, and plots the participation
constraints of the large lender (λL(D)), small lenders (λS(D)), and ﬁrm’s iso–
proﬁt curves. The optimal capital structure is denoted by (D∗∗,λ ∗∗).
Figure 4: Optimal Capital Structure with Eﬃcient Coordination
The ﬁgure depicts a typical situation of an interior solution for a project of lower
quality and intermediate opportunity costs, and plots the participation constraints
of the large lender (λL(D)), small lenders (λS(D)), and the ﬁrm’s iso–proﬁt curves
(the dashed lines). The optimal capital structure is denoted by (D∗∗,λ ∗∗).
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How is it possible that the existence of a large lender is beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm,
although we learned in Section 2.2 that at the interim stage the existence of a
large lender is always detrimental to ﬁrm proﬁts? The diﬀerence in the ex ante
perception comes from the fact that the large lender is able to renegotiate his
debt contract, thereby allowing the continuation of the ﬁrm in more states of the
world. The debt repayment D that is promised to small lenders in t = 0 includes
a risk premium to compensate lenders for the default risk of the ﬁrm (K<D ).
If the presence of the large lender extends the states of nature where the ﬁrm is
continued, this reduces the default risk ex ante and, thereby, the repayment that
must be promised to small lenders.
As Figure 3 shows, the borders between diﬀerent ﬁnancing structures are
18increasing functions in a µ–(R −K)–space. That is, for low opportunity costs of
capital or high expected cash ﬂow, a ﬁrm is more likely to choose ﬁnancing with a
low share of debt concentrated on a single lender or without relationship lender.
Simulations indicate that there are monotone relationships and λ is decreasing
with decreasing R and rising µ.
3.2 Optimal Debt Structure with Ineﬃcient Coordination
For the case of ineﬃcient coordination, we have already shown that asymmetric
ﬁnancing with 0 <λ<1 may be the optimal choice, when D is exogenous and
suﬃciently low. Now, we also take participation constraints into account. Credits
will be extended whenever
θ ≥ ¯ θ = V + λK +( 1− λ)W = V + W − λ(W − K).
Here, the failure point does not depend on D.
Firm’s Expected Proﬁts
If credits are extended, the ﬁrm earns positive proﬁts if and only if θ ≥ ˆ θ.A s
s h o w ni ns e c t i o n2 . 2 ,¯ θ<ˆ θ is equivalent to λ>ˆ λ. ˆ λ is a decreasing and concave
function of D with ˆ λ(D = W)=0 .
Firm’s expected proﬁts are
E(πF)=
1
2τ
  µ+τ
max{¯ θ,ˆ θ}
(θ − ˆ θ)dθ =



(µ+τ−ˆ θ)2
4τ if λ>ˆ λ
(µ+τ)2−¯ θ2−2 ˆ θ (µ+τ−¯ θ)
4τ if λ<ˆ λ
For λ>ˆ λ, we ﬁnd E(πF) decreasing in λ and D with iso-proﬁt-curves de-
creasing and concave with slope
−(1−λ)
W∗−D, as in the case of eﬃcient coordination.
For λ = ˆ λ, expected proﬁts are also decreasing in D.
For λ∗ <λ<ˆ λ, iso-proﬁt curves are decreasing and concave. For λ<λ ∗,
iso–proﬁt curves are increasing and convex (see Figure 5 for an example).
Small Lenders’ Participation
The payoﬀ to a small lender is K if θ<¯ θ and D otherwise. The small lenders
expected proﬁts are
E(πS)=K +( D − K)prob(θ>¯ θ)=K +( D − K)
µ + τ − ¯ θ
2τ
. (16)
19This is similar to the case with eﬃcient coordination except for the critical
threshold (¯ θ instead of θ), which reﬂects the change in our assumption regarding
small lender coordination.
Participation of the small lender requires
E(πS) ≥ R ⇔ λ ≥ λ
IC
S =
2τ R−K
D−K + V + W − µ − τ
W − K
(17)
The superscript IC denotes the case of ineﬃcient coordination of small lenders.
λIC
S is a decreasing and convex function in D and increasing in R.
Furthermore,
λ
IC
S (D) < 1 ⇔ D>D 1 = K +
2τ(R − K)
µ + τ − V − K
.
λ
IC
S (D) > 0 ⇔ D<D 0 = K +
2τ(R − K)
µ + τ − V − W
,D 0 >D 1
A typical example of the small lender’s participation constraint is given in Figure
5.
Large Lender’s Participation
The large lender’s payoﬀ is
πL =

   
   
K if θ<¯ θ
θ−V −(1−λ)D
λ if ¯ θ ≤ θ<ˆ θ
W ∗ if θ ≥ ¯ θ ∧ θ ≥ ˆ θ
Expected payoﬀ to a large lender is
E(πL)=



K prob(θ<¯ θ)+W ∗ prob(θ ≥ ¯ θ)i f λ ≤ ˆ λ
K prob(θ<¯ θ)+
  ˆ θ
¯ θ
θ−V −(1−λ)D
2τλ dθ + W ∗ prob(θ ≥ ˆ θ)i fλ ≥ ˆ λ
Participation requires E(πL) ≥ R, which leads to the participation constraint
E(πL)=



K(¯ θ−λW∗−µ+τ)−W∗(V +(1−λ)W−µ−τ)
2τ ≥ R if λ ≤ ˆ λ
(V +(1−λ)D)¯ θ− 1
2
¯ θ2−(V +(1−λ)D)ˆ θ+ 1
2
ˆ θ2
2λτ +
K(¯ θ−µ+τ)
2τ +
W∗(µ+τ−ˆ θ)
2τ ≥ R if λ>ˆ λ
(18)
Let us concentrate on the case λ ≤ ˆ λ. Solving for λ yields the space of feasible
ﬁnancing shares meeting the large lender’s participation constraint
λ>λ
IC
L =
2τ R−K
W∗−K − µ − τ + V + W
W − K
, (19)
20which is independent from D.F o rλ ≤ ˆ λ, the payoﬀ to the large lender is K in
case of failure and W ∗ in case of success. The failure point ¯ θ does not depend
on D either, because we assumed most ineﬃcient coordination of small lenders.
Here, the size of the large lender is the only determinant of the failure point
(provided that λ<ˆ λ). Participation requires this size to be suﬃciently large
to increase the probability of success to a level at which large lender’s expected
payoﬀ exceeds opportunity costs R.
For λ ≤ ˆ λ the large lender’s constraint is smaller than λIC
S for all D<W ∗.
Theorem 3 For ineﬃcient coordination of small lenders in the reﬁnancing game,
the optimal ﬁnancing structure (D∗∗∗,λ ∗∗∗) is such that λ∗∗∗ >λ ∗(D), whenever
the ﬁrm can be ﬁnanced at all.
Proof: If the ﬁrm can be ﬁnanced, the optimal (D∗∗∗,λ ∗∗∗) is either such that
λ∗∗∗ > ˆ λ(D) >λ ∗(D), or λ∗∗∗ < ˆ λ(D). In the latter case λIC
S >λ IC
L ,s ot h a t
the large lender’s constraint is not binding. The small lenders’ constraint has a
negative slope, while iso–proﬁt curves have negative slope only for λ>λ ∗. Hence,
the optimal ﬁnancial structure does always imply λ∗∗∗ >λ ∗(D). QED
The theorem shows that debt forgiveness of the large lender is valuable for
small lenders. Compared to the situation where D is given exogenously (with
the proﬁt maximizing λ∗, see Section 2.2), taking small lenders’ participation
constraint into account tends to raise the optimal size of the large lender.
In the case of eﬃcient coordination we saw that the ﬁrm will always pick
λ = 0 if the loss given default is suﬃciently low. This does not apply to the case
of ineﬃcient coordination.
Theorem 4 If R − K is suﬃciently small and µ<V− τ + W +
(W−K)2
W∗−K ,t h e n
λ>0.
Proof:
R − K → 0 ⇒ λS(D) →
V + W − µ − τ
W − K
< 0.
Thus, for suﬃciently low R − K, small lenders’ participation constraint is not
binding and the optimal contract (D∗∗∗,λ ∗∗∗) approaches (K,λ∗(D = K)), pro-
vided that
λ
∗(D = K) > 0 ⇔ µ<V− τ + W +
(W − K)2
W ∗ − K
.
21QED
Theorem 4 tells us that for some projects asymmetric ﬁnancing is optimal,
even when the loss given default is small. The reason is that ineﬃcient coordina-
tion of lenders in cases of ﬁnancial distress reduces prior expected returns in the
absence of a relationship bank.
Figure 5 shows an example for the case of an optimal λ between zero and
one, where λIC
S and λIC
L denote the participation constraints of small lenders and
the large lender, respectively, πF = c1,2 denotes iso-proﬁt curves of the ﬁrm with
c1 <c 2,a n d( λ∗∗∗,D ∗∗∗) denotes the optimal debt contract.
Figure 5: Optimal Capital Structure with Ineﬃcient coordination
The ﬁgure shows an example for the case of an optimal λ between zero and
one under most ineﬃcient coordination of small lenders. λIC
S and λIC
L denote
the participation constraints of small lenders and the large lender, respectively,
πF = c1,2 denotes iso-proﬁt curves of the ﬁrm with c1 <c 2, and (λ∗∗∗,D ∗∗∗)
denotes the optimal debt contract.
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4 The Role of Collateral
Several empirical studies on relationship lending analyze the association between
the incidence of relationship lending and collateralization of loan contracts. The
results are mixed, however. While some studies ﬁnd that relationship lenders are
22on average more collateralized than arm’s-length lenders (see Elsas and Krahnen
(2002), Degryse and van Cayseele (2000)), others ﬁnd the opposite (see Berger
and Udell (1995), Harhoﬀ and K¨ orting (1998)). Our model can help explaining
this seemingly contradictory pattern, because i) all of these studies analyze a
cross-section of ﬁrms with ﬁnancing from multiple banks, and ii) relationship
lending is often identiﬁed by the share of the relationship lender of total borrower
ﬁnancing (or correlated measures).6
In our model, the early liquidation value K serves as collateral for lenders.
For instance, one may think of a situation where the ﬁrm raises capital ex ante to
ﬁnance certain input factors in the production process. These assets are saleable
at the interim stage t = 3 for K and can be oﬀered as collateral. Therefore, higher
asset speciﬁcity translates into a lower collateral value K.N o w ,i f( af r a c t i o no f
the) lenders decide to withdraw credit at t = 3, they receive assets and sell them.
A ﬁrm who nevertheless wants to continue the project reﬁnances the withdrawn
credit, replacing the input factors with the money taken up.
We assume that the liquidation value does not diﬀer per se for relationship
and arm’s-length lenders, and that no priority structure of collateralization ex-
ists. Hence, each ﬁnancier’s share of K is proportional to its share of borrower
ﬁnancing. The early liquidation value characterizes a project together with dis-
tributional parameters, so that it diﬀers in the cross-section of ﬁrms.
The association between collateral and the optimal ﬁnancing share is non-
trivial. Collateral aﬀects renegotiations between the ﬁrm and the large lender.
Higher collateral reduces the loss given default and thereby relaxes lenders’ par-
ticipation constraints. However, it also reduces the maximum debt forgiveness
by the large lender and, thereby, raises the prior probability of default. This has
ambiguous implications for the optimal size of the large lender, especially in the
case of ineﬃcient coordination.
To explain this relationship, let us focus on the case of ineﬃcient coordination.
For exogenously given face value of debt D, the ﬁrm chooses a relationship lender
of size λ∗ provided that λ∗ ≥ 0.
6See Elsas (2004) for an analysis of proxy variables to identify relationship lending in em-
pirical work.
23Theorem 5 With rising K, λ∗ is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing.
Proof: Consider expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm as a function of λ. λ∗ is deﬁned
by
∂E(πF)
∂λ = 0. Equation (9) implies that the cross derivative of this expression
with respect to K is
∂2E(πF)
∂λ ∂K
=
1
2τ
[W − D − 2λ(W − K)].
If this is negative at some λ,t h e nar i s ei nK lowers the slope of expected
proﬁts at the respective λ. Evaluating this cross derivative at λ∗ we can conclude
whether K raises or lowers λ∗.
1
2τ
[W − D − 2λ
∗ (W − K)] < 0 ⇔ K<W− 2
W ∗ − D
W − D
[µ + τ − V − D].
Thus, for low K the slope of expected proﬁts at the previously optimal λ becomes
negative, which implies that λ∗ must be reduced. If K exceeds a critical level, a
further increase in K raises the optimal size of the large lender. QED
The economic rationale of this result can be understood if we compare the two
eﬀects of relationship lending that are balanced by λ∗.A ni n c r e a s ei nλ reduces
the failure point and thereby increases the set of states in which the ﬁrm earns
positive proﬁts, but it reduces proﬁts of the ﬁrm in these states of nature. An
increase in K raises the failure point, but has no eﬀect on state contingent proﬁts
θ − ˆ θ.
We know that ∂¯ θ/∂λ= −(W − K). The eﬀect of λ on the default point is
stronger, the smaller K is. For low collateral K the ﬁrm attributes more weight to
the positive eﬀect that relationship lending has on the default point and chooses
ah i g h e rλ. The relationship is not monotone, though, because an increase in K
reduces the number of states in which the ﬁrm earns positive proﬁts. Thereby,
an increase in K also weakens the negative eﬀect that relationship lending has
due to the hold–up problem. If K becomes large, the latter eﬀect may dominate,
and any further increase in K m a yl e a dt oar i s ei nλ.
A positive eﬀect of K on λ requires that µ+τ −V , W, and/or W ∗ are small
in comparison with D. Only then, the eﬀect of K on the left margin of the set
of states in which the ﬁrm succeeds is severe enough to make an increase in λ
proﬁtable ex ante.
24When repayments are treated as endogenous, a higher liquidation value aﬀects
the optimal ﬁnancing structure also because it reduces the losses that withdrawing
lenders incur at the reﬁnancing stage. This increases expected payoﬀs and relaxes
participation constraints of all lenders. Whenever participation constraints are
binding, they require a minimum size of the large lender. Hence, any relaxation
of these constraints strengthens the case for a negative impact of collateral on
the optimal size of the large lender.
In sum, a non–linear association between K and the optimal ﬁnancing share
is to be expected. Deriving the partial derivative for the optimal ﬁnancing share
is analytically intractable and we rely on simulations. Figure 6 plots the optimal
ﬁnancing share for diﬀerent values of K in the case of ineﬃcient coordination.7
Figure 6: The Optimal Financing Share of Relationship Lending with Varying
Liquidation Values
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As becomes evident from Figure 6, the association between the ﬁnancing
share and K is indeed non–linear and even non–monotonic. Hence, when using a
cross–section of ﬁrms with heterogeneous asset liquidation values, this pattern can
explain the seemingly contradictory pattern in empirical studies. Depending on
the sample composition, the average correlation between a relationship lender’s
ﬁnancing share (or correlated variables) and collateral can be positive or negative.
7For the other parameters, we have chosen µ =1 .8, τ =0 .9, V =0 .4, R =1 ,W∗ =1 .3, and
W =1 .25).
255 Asymmetric Information and the Relation-
ship Lender’s Information Privilege
The preceding discussion has shown that under some conditions the co-existence
of arm’s-length and relationship ﬁnancing can endogenously be the optimal ﬁ-
nancing choice of ﬁrms. It is interesting to note that relationship lending can be
beneﬁcial even without an active role as a ﬁrm’s monitor. The ability to renego-
tiate loan contracts generates value. Joint ﬁnancing from small banks and one
relationship lender balances the relationship lenders’ bargaining power and debt
forgiveness. This corresponds to the analysis of Gorton and Kahn (2000), and is
in the spirit of the theoretical literature discussing the optimal maturity structure
of loan contracts (Hart (2001) and Diamond (2004)).
By abstracting from monitoring and private information, however, we ignore
one essential part of the relationship lending concept, which also explains bar-
gaining power of the relationship lender endogenously (Rajan (1992)). Yet, it is
straightforward to show that imperfect signals and an information privilege of
the large lender do not alter our qualitative results.
The framework which can be used to this end is global games, an equilibrium
reﬁnement developed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993).8 Relying on this
framework, Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2000) have shown that the
presence of a large player with an informational advantage eases the coordination
problem and leads small players to change their thresholds for engaging in the
risky action towards the eﬃcient solution.
The global games solution introduces noisy signals about the state of nature,
here the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. To illustrate the idea, assume the large lender still knows
the true realization of θ but small lenders’ information is xi = θ+ui. Error terms
ui are pairwise independent for i  = j and have a uniform distribution in [− ,+ ].
If   is suﬃciently small, there is a unique equilibrium with thresholds x∗ and θ∗,
such that a small lender extends credit, if and only if xi ≥ x∗, and the large
lender extends credit if and only if θ ≥ θ∗. θ∗ is also the default point of the ﬁrm.
8Global games have recently been applied to the coordination problem of reﬁnancing in
Morris and Shin (2001) and Hubert and Sch¨ afer (2002) and perform quite well in experiments
on coordination games, see Heinemann (2002).
26For the case of   → 0, thresholds x∗ and θ∗ converge to each other and approach
θ
∗ = V + D − λ(D − K)+( 1− λ)K (W/D − 1) (20)
As in our previous analysis, the default point decreases in the relationship
lender’s ﬁnancing share:
dθ∗
dλ
= −(D − K) − K (W/D − 1) < 0. (21)
Comparing the default point of the global games solution with default points
for eﬃcient and (most) ineﬃcient coordination shows that θ <θ ∗ < ¯ θ and
d ¯ θ
dλ
<
dθ∗
dλ
<
dθ
dλ
.
Hence, similar to the case of ineﬃcient coordination in Section 2.2, even if one
abstracts from the risk premia reduction that the existence of the large lender
induces because of his debt forgiveness, an asymmetric ﬁnancing structure can
be beneﬁcial, but the optimal λ will be smaller than in the case with ineﬃcient
coordination. Furthermore, the positive eﬀect of relationship lending on prior
expected payoﬀs is also somewhere between the two cases analyzed above, while
the negative eﬀect stemming from the hold–up problem does not depend on the
eﬃciency of coordination. Therefore, we may expect intermediate solutions for
the optimal size as well.
6 Conclusions
We have examined the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple
but asymmetric bank ﬁnancing. This has been motivated by the empirical stylized
fact that ﬁrms rely on multiple banks as ﬁnanciers, where one can be special in
the sense of relationship lending.
In our framework it can be optimal for entrepreneurs to ﬁnance their project
by a multitude of equal and individually small banks who are unable to coordinate
their decisions and a relationship bank with a high ﬁnancing share and bargaining
power. The presence of both lender types helps to optimally balance coordination
risk and the hold-up-problem. Interestingly, especially ﬁrms with a high asset
speciﬁcity (a high expected loss given default from the banks’ perspective) or
27with low expected cash ﬂows prefer a ﬁnancing arrangement that is characterized
by the co–existence of arm’s length ﬁnanciers and a relationship bank.
Our discussion of comparative statics oﬀers an explanation for the contra-
dictory evidence with respect to the association of relationship lending and loan
collateralization. The model predicts a non-monotonic association between as-
set liquidation values (collateral value) and the importance of the relationship
lender. Accordingly, depending on the sample at hand in a cross-sectional study,
a positive or negative correlation can be observed empirically.
Finally, the model oﬀers a framework to analyze strategic choices of the bor-
rower and the corresponding impact on the debt structure. For instance, one
interesting problem arises if the borrower can increase the risk of an investment
project (i.e. asset substitution). Another extension would be to allow for an
endogenous (i.e. strategic) distribution of information by the borrower. These
issues must be left for future research.
28Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 2
Small lenders’ participation constraint λS is a function in D with the following
properties: At D = R
λS(D = R)=
V + R − µ + τ
R − K
> 1.
With rising D, λS is ﬁrst decreasing below 1 and then increasing to one as
D →∞ .
λS > 1 ⇔ D<D 1 = K +
2τ (R − K)
µ + τ − V − K
,
∂λ S
∂D
=
(D − K)2 +( D − K)[µ + τ − V − D] − 4τ (R − K)
(D − K)3 ,
∂λ S
∂D
< 0 ⇔ D<D 2 = K +
4τ (R − K)
µ + τ − V − K
,D 2 >D 1.
From (12) we see that λS is rising in R. The higher the opportunity costs of
small lenders, the higher is the requirement on the size of the large lender. If
R<R 0 = K +
1
8τ
(µ + τ − V − K)
2, (22)
then λs falls below zero before rising again.
λS < 0 ⇔ D ∈

µ + τ − V + K
2
±
 
(µ + τ − V − K)2
4
− 2τ (R − K)

.
Denote the lower end of this interval by D5. If the ﬁrm chooses ﬁnancing by
small lenders only (λ = 0), then it will oﬀer a repayment of D5. Rising R shifts
the participation constraint up, so that with suﬃciently high opportunity costs
(R>R 0) a relationship lender becomes necessary to attract small lenders.
For the large lender’s participation constraint we must distinguish two cases:
1. If
R>R 2 = K +
W ∗ − K
2τ
 
µ + τ − V −
W ∗ + K
2
 
, (23)
the partial derivative
∂λ L
∂D is negative for all D  = W∗+K
2 . The second
derivative is negative for D<W∗+K
2 and positive for D>W∗+K
2 .F o r
D>W∗+K
2 , participation requires λ>λ L(D) > 1, which cannot be ful-
ﬁlled. For D →− ∞or D →∞ , λL approaches 1. For D   W∗+K
2 , λL
approaches minus inﬁnity. For D   W∗+K
2 , λL approaches plus inﬁnity
(see Figure ??aa b o v e ) .
292. If R<R 2, the partial derivative
∂λ L
∂D is positive for all D  = W∗+K
2 .T h e
second derivative is positive for D<W∗+K
2 and negative for D>W∗+K
2 .I f
D<W∗+K
2 , participation requires λ<λ L(D), while λL(D) > 1. Here, the
large lender accepts any share. For D →− ∞or D →∞ , λL approaches 1.
For D   W∗+K
2 , λL approaches inﬁnity. For D   W∗+K
2 , λL approaches
minus inﬁnity.
In the ﬁrst case participation of the large lender requires λ<λ L(D)a n d
D<W∗+K
2 . In the second case the large lender requires λ>λ L(D)o rD<W∗+K
2 .
We cannot derive an explicit solution for the optimal size of the large lender.
We will use a partition of the parameter space to characterize the conditions
for which the ﬁrm chooses asymmetric ﬁnancing and those for which the ﬁrm is
ﬁnanced by small lenders only, by single large lender, or not at all. The borders
between these regions are hyperplanes that can be described by functions that
represent R depending on the other parameters.
R0 = K +
1
8τ
(µ + τ − V − K)
2,
R1 = K +
W ∗ − K
4τ
(µ + τ − V − K),
R2 = K +
W ∗ − K
2τ
 
µ + τ − V −
W ∗ + K
2
 
,
R4 = K +
W − K
2τ
(µ + τ − V − K),
R5 = K +
W ∗2
τ


 
1+
(µ + τ − V − K)2
4W ∗2 − 1

,
R6 = K +
W − K
2τ
(µ + τ − V − W).
In addition, we need critical values for µ, deﬁned as
µ1 = V − τ + W
∗ +
W ∗ − K
√
2 − 1
,
µ2 = V − τ +2W − K.
µ3 = V − τ + K +
(W ∗ − K)2
2(W ∗ − W)
.
30Using these deﬁnitions, Theorem 2 can be restated as follows.
Theorem 2
a) The ﬁrm can be ﬁnanced if and only if R<R 2.
b) The ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by a single large lender (λ =1 ) ,i fa n do n l yi fR4 ≤ R ≤
R2. R4 ≤ R2 requires µ ≥ µ3 and W ∗ − W>
(W∗−K)2
4τ .
c) There is an intermediate region for R − K, for which the optimal ﬁnanc-
ing structure is asymmetric. For µ<µ 2 there is asymmetric ﬁnancing, when-
ever R5 <R<R 2.F o r µ>µ 2 there is asymmetric ﬁnancing, whenever
min{R5,R 6} <R<min{R2,R 4}. Both regions have a non-empty interior.
d) For suﬃciently low R −K, the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by small lenders only (λ =0 ) .
For µ<µ 2, λ = 0 whenever R<R 5.F o rµ>µ 2, λ =0i fR<min{R5,R 6}.
e) The critical values of R − K at which the ﬁrm gets ﬁnanced from any type of
lender are monotonically increasing in µ and decreasing in V .
The proof combines a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1 (i) R2, R4 and R6 are linear in µ.I f W ∗ >W ,t h e nR2 is steeper
than R4 and R6,
(ii) R4 >R 6,
(iii) R2 >R 1,
(iv) R0 and R5 are convex in µ,
(v) R0 ≥ R6 and R0 = R6 if and only if µ = µ2
(vi) R0 >R 5,a n d
(vii) R2 >R 6.
Proof: (i) is obvious from deﬁnitions of R2, R4 and R6, and (ii) follows from
W>K .
(iii) R2 >R 1 is equivalent to
2(µ + τ − V − (W
∗ + K)/2) >µ+ τ − V − K ⇔ µ + τ − V − W
∗ > 0.
The last inequality is our assumption on the upper bound of the prior distribu-
tion’s support.
(iv) Convexity of R0 is obvious from the quadratic form. Convexity of R5
31requires ∂2 R5
∂2 µ > 0.
∂R 5
∂µ
=
(µ + τ − V − K)
4τ
 
1+
(µ+τ−V −K)2
4W∗2
⇒
∂2 R5
∂2 µ
=
1
4τ
√
·−
(µ+τ−V −K)2
4W∗2 √
·
(
√
·)2 =
1
4τ (
√
·)3 > 0.
(v)
R0 ≥ R6 ⇔ (µ + τ − V − K)
2 ≥ 4(W − K)(µ + τ − V − W) (24)
⇔ (µ + τ − V + K − 2W)
2 +4( W − K)(µ + τ − V − K) − 4(W − K)
2
≥ 4(W − K)(µ + τ − V − W)
⇔ (µ + τ − V + K − 2W)
2 ≥ 0.
(vi)
R0 >R 5 ⇔
(µ + τ − V − K)2
8W ∗2 >
 
1+
(µ + τ − V − K)2
4W ∗2 − 1. (25)
Deﬁne A =
(µ+τ−V −K)2
8W∗2 .T h e n
R0 >R 5 ⇔ A −
√
1+2A +1> 0.
For A = 0, the left hand side equals zero. Furthermore, the left hand side is
increasing in A.S i n c eA>0, we ﬁnd that R0 >R 5.
(vii) R2 and R6 are both linear increasing in µ. R6 is ﬂatter. Hence, it is
suﬃcient to show that R6 <R 2 for the lowest possible µ = W ∗ + V − τ. Here,
R0 <R 2.S i n c eR6 ≤ R0 from (v), it follows that R6 <R 2.Q E D
Lemma 2 R0 <R 2 is equivalent to µ<µ 1.
Proof:
R0 <R 2 ⇔ (W
∗−K)
 
µ + τ − V −
W ∗ + K
2
 
>
1
4
[µ + τ − V − K]
2(26)
⇔ 4(µ + τ − V )(W
∗ − K) − 2(W
∗ + K)(W
∗ − K)
> (µ + τ − V )
2 − 2(µ + τ − V )K + K
2
⇔ 4(µ + τ − V )W
∗ − 2(µ + τ − V )K − 2W
∗2 + K
2 > (µ + τ − V )
2
32⇔ (µ + τ − V )
2 − 2(µ + τ − V )K + K
2 > 2(µ + τ − V )
2 − 4(µ + τ − V )W
∗ +2W
∗2
⇔ (µ + τ − V − K)
2 > 2(µ + τ − V − W
∗)
2
⇔ µ + τ − V − K>
√
2(µ + τ − V − W
∗)
⇔ µ<µ 1 = V − τ + W
∗ +
W ∗ − K
√
2 − 1
.
Lemma 3 For R>R 2, it is impossible to get ﬁnanced with λ>0.
Proof: For R>R 2, the large lender provides capital only, when there are some
small lenders and D<W∗+K
2 . Asymmetric ﬁnancing, however, is impossible if
λS(D) > 1 for all D<W∗+K
2 .T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
D1 >
W ∗ + K
2
⇔ 2τ (R − K) >
W ∗ − K
2
(µ + τ − V − K)
⇔ R>R 1 = K +
W ∗ − K
4τ
(µ + τ − V − K)
Since R2 >R 1, it is not possible to get asymmetric ﬁnancing either. QED
For R<R 0 small lenders are willing to ﬁnance the project without relation-
ship bank, provided that D ≥ D5. The required payment D5 may, however, be
higher than costs of reﬁnancing. If the ﬁrm has the option to drive out small
lenders at the stage of the reﬁnancing game and replace them with new creditors
at this stage, then promised payments D>Ware not credible, since it is cheaper
to replace them if the project generates a suﬃciently high payoﬀ, while otherwise
the ﬁrm goes bankrupt.
Lemma 4 D5 <W if and only if
µ<µ 2 = V − τ +2W − K ∨ R<R 6.
Proof: From Lemma 1(v) we know that R6 ≤ R0.T h e r e b y ,R ≤ R6 implies
existence of D5.
D5 =
µ + τ − V + K
2
−
 
(µ + τ − V − K)2
4
− 2τ (R − K) <W
⇔
µ + τ − V − 2W + K
2
<
 
(µ + τ − V − K)2
4
− 2τ (R − K)
33⇔ µ<µ 2 ∨
(µ + τ − V − 2W + K)2
4
<
(µ + τ − V − K)2
4
− 2τ (R − K)
The second inequality is equivalent to
2τ (R − K) <
1
4
 
(µ + τ − V − K)
2 − (µ + τ − V − 2W + K)
2
 
⇔ (R − K) <
1
8τ
 
(µ + τ − V )
2 − 2(µ + τ − V )K + K
2
−(µ + τ − V )
2 +2( µ + τ − V )(2W − K) − (2W − K)
2
 
⇔ R<K+
1
8τ
 
K
2 +2( µ + τ − V )(2W − 2K) − (4W
2 − 4WK+ K
2)
 
⇔ R<R 6 = K +
W − K
2τ
(µ + τ − V − W).
QED
Lemma 5 µ1 >µ 2.
Proof:
µ1 >µ 2 ⇔ W
∗ +
W ∗ − K
√
2 − 1
> 2W − K
⇔ (W
∗ − K)+
 
1+
1
√
2 − 1
 
> 2(W − K)
⇔
W ∗ − K
W − K
> 2 −
√
2.
Since W ∗ ≥ W and 2 −
√
2 < 1, this implies µ1 >µ 2.Q E D
Lemma 6 For R>R 2 the ﬁrm cannot be ﬁnanced.
Proof: From Lemma 3 we know that for R>R 2 the ﬁrm cannot get a large
lender. Small lenders are willing to ﬁnance the whole project if R ≤ R0 and
D ≥ D5. Lemma 2 tells us that R2 <R≤ R0 requires µ>µ 1. ¿From Lemma 5
we know that µ1 >µ 2. Hence, Lemma 4 implies that D5 <Wrequires R<R 6.
However, Lemma 1(vii) tells us that R6 <R 2.T h e r e b y , R>R 2 implies that
small lenders are not willing to ﬁnance the whole project at a promised repayment
D<W.Q E D
If R ≤ R2, the large lender is willing to ﬁnance the whole project. Thus, the
project is ﬁnanced if and only if R ≤ R2. This establishes the ﬁrst part of the
theorem.
34Lemma 7 For R4 ≤ R ≤ R2, the optimal ﬁnancing structure implies λ =1 .
This case can only occur if R4 ≤ R2, which is equivalent to µ ≥ µ3 and requires
W ∗ − W>
(W∗−K)2
4τ .
Proof: If R<R 2, the large lender is willing to ﬁnance the whole project
or a large part of it. Small lenders are willing to provide funds if and only if
D1 <D≤ W. Lower repayments violate the participation constraint and higher
repayments are not credible, because then, the ﬁrm would replace small lenders
at stage 4. D1 <Wis equivalent to
2τ (R − K) < (W − K)(µ + τ − V − K)
⇔ R<R 4 = K +
W − K
2τ
(µ + τ − V − K). (27)
Thus, for R4 ≤ R ≤ R2 small lenders are not willing to provide funds.
This case requires R4 ≤ R2, which is equivalent to
(W − K)[µ + τ − V − K] ≤ (W
∗ − K)
 
µ + τ − V − K −
W ∗ − K
2
 
⇔ (W
∗ − W)[µ + τ − V − K] ≥
(W ∗ − K)2
2
⇔ µ ≥ µ3.
Basic assumptions require µ<τ+V +K. Thereby, existence of this case requires
µ3 <τ+ V + K, which is equivalent to W ∗ − W>
(W∗−K)2
4τ .Q E D
Lemma 7 establishes the second part of the theorem and calls for some eco-
nomic rationale: If the ﬁrm could commit to pay small lenders more than W,
then small lenders would be willing to provide funds. Moreover, ﬁrm’s expected
proﬁts would increase, because the promised repayment could be lower than W ∗,
which is the amount that the large lender extracts anyway. If such a commitment
is not possible, then small lenders will not provide funds, because the maximum
credible repayment is too low to cover the default risk. The large lender, how-
ever, is willing to provide funds, because he knows that he can extract up to W ∗,
whenever the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow is high enough. This is the only case in which the
ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by a single large lender. If costs of reﬁnancing do not depend on
the size of the credit, i.e. W ∗ = W, the ﬁrm will never choose λ =1 .
Lemma 8 For R ≤ R2 and R<R 4 the optimal ﬁnancing structure does always
imply λ<1.
35Proof: At λ = 1, the ﬁrm’s iso–proﬁt–curves are horizontal (see Figure 4).
Thus, the ﬁrm would prefer an asymmetric debt structure if it is possible to
attract small lenders at any D ≤ W. This requires D1 <Wwhich is equivalent
to R<R 4.Q E D
Lemma 9 For R0 <R≤ R2, the optimal ﬁnancing structure implies λ>0.
Proof: For R0 <R≤ R2, the large lender is willing to ﬁnance the whole
project or a suﬃciently large part of it. Small lenders are not willing to ﬁnance
the project without relationship bank. Hence, any solution implies λ>0. QED
Lemma 10 If R6 <R≤ R2 and µ>µ 2, the optimal ﬁnancing structure implies
λ>0.
Proof: For µ>µ 2 and R>R 6, we know from Lemma 4 that small lenders
are not willing to ﬁnance the project without relationship bank at any D ≤ W.
QED
Lemma 11 µ<µ 2 implies R2 <R 4.
Proof: µ<µ 2 implies
(W
∗ − W)(µ + τ − V − K) < 2(W
∗ − W)(W − K).
R2 <R 4 is equivalent to
(W
∗ − K)
 
µ + τ − V − K −
W ∗ − K
2
 
< (W − K)(µ + τ − V − K)
⇔ (W
∗ − W)(µ + τ − V − K) <
(W ∗ − K)2
2
.
⇐ 2(W
∗ − W)(W − K) <
(W ∗ − K)2
2
⇔ 4(W
∗ − W)(W − K) < (W
∗ − W + W − K)
2
⇔ 4(W
∗ − W)(W − K) < (W
∗ − W)
2 +2( W
∗ − W)(W − K)+( W − K)
2
⇔ 2(W
∗ − W)(W − K) < (W
∗ − W)
2 +( W − K)
2
⇔ 0 < ((W
∗ − W) − (W − K))
2 =( W
∗ + K)
2.
QED
36Lemma 12 If R5 <R<min{R0,R 2},t h e nλ>0.
Proof: D5 is increasing in R. Therefore, R<R 0 implies D5(R) <D 5(R0)=
µ+τ−V +K
2 .T h i si ss m a l l e rt h a nW∗+K
2 , because µ+τ<W ∗ +V .F o rR<R 2 the
large lender accepts any share in the debt, provided that D<W∗+K
2 . Thus, his
participation constraint is not binding, and the ﬁrm chooses λ>0 if and only if
the iso–proﬁt curve at (D5,λ= 0) is steeper than λS. The ﬁrm’s iso–proﬁt curve
at D5 is steeper than λS if and only if
−
∂λ (D5)
∂D
       
 E(πF)=const.
> −
∂λ S(D5)
∂D
, (28)
where
∂λ S
∂D
=
(D − K)2 +( D − K)[µ + τ − V − D] − 4τ (R − K)
(D − K)3
=
(D − K)2 − (D − K)[µ + τ − V − D]+2( D − K)[µ + τ − V − D] − 4τ (R − K)
(D − K)3
=
(D − K) − [µ + τ − V − D]
(D − K)2 −
2λS(D)
(D − K)
.
Then, (28) is equivalent to
1
W ∗ − D5
>
µ + τ − V + K − 2D5
(D5 − K)2
⇔ (D5 − K)
2 > (W
∗ − D5)(µ + τ − V + K − 2D5)
⇔

µ + τ − V − K
2
−
 
(µ + τ − V − K)2
4
− 2τ (R − K)


2
> (W
∗ − D5)2
√
·
⇔
(µ + τ − V − K)2
2
− [µ + τ − V − K]
√
·−2τ (R − K)
>
 
W
∗ −
µ + τ − V + K
2
+
√
·
 
2
√
·
=2W
∗ √
·−[µ + τ − V − K]
√
· +
(µ + τ − V − K)2
2
− 4τ (R − K)
⇔ 0 > 2W
∗ √
·−2τ (R − K)
37⇔ τ (R − K) >W
∗ √
·
⇔ τ
2 (R − K)
2 >W
∗2
 
(µ + τ − V − K)2
4
− 2τ (R − K)
 
⇔ τ
2 (R − K)
2 +2τ (R − K)W
∗2 + W
∗4 >W
∗4 + W
∗2 (µ + τ − V − K)2
4
⇔ τ (R − K)+W
∗2 >
 
W ∗4 + W ∗2 (µ + τ − V − K)2
4
⇔ R>R 5 = K +
W ∗2
τ


 
1+
(µ + τ − V − K)2
4W ∗2 − 1


QED
Lemma 13 There is an intermediate region for R, for which the optimal ﬁnanc-
ing structure is asymmetric, i.e. 0 <λ<1.F o r µ<µ 2, there is asymmetric
ﬁnancing, whenever R5 <R<R 2.F o r µ>µ 2 there is asymmetric ﬁnanc-
ing, whenever min{R5,R 6} <R<min{R2,R 4}. Both regions have a non-empty
interior.
Proof: From Lemma 1 we know that R6 <R 4 and R6 <R 2.F o r µ>µ 2
Lemma 8, 12 and 10 imply 0 <λ<1 for min{R5,R 6} <R<min{R2,R 4}.F o r
µ<µ 2, Lemma 11 implies R2 <R 4 and Lemma 2 and 5 imply R0 <R 2. Here,
Lemma 8, 9 and 12 imply 0 <λ<1 for R5 <R<R 2.Q E D
This establishes the third part of the theorem.
Lemma 14 The optimal ﬁnancing structure is D = D5 and λ =0 ,i fe i t h e r
(i) µ ≤ µ2 and R ≤ R5
or
(ii)µ>µ 2 and R ≤ min{R5,R 6}
Proof: If the iso–proﬁt curve at (D5,λ = 0) is not steeper than λS,t h e ni t
is optimal to choose D = D5 and λ =0p r o v i d e dt h a tD5 ≤ W,w h i c hr e q u i r e s
R ≤ R6 or µ ≤ µ2 by Lemma 4. The proof of Lemma 12 implies that for R<R 5
the iso–proﬁt curve at (D5,λ= 0) is not steeper than λS.Q E D
This establishes the fourth part of the theorem. The borders between the
diﬀerent ﬁnancing structures are continuous in all parameters and deﬁned by
parts of the functions R0 to R6. These functions are monotonically increasing in
µ and decreasing in V . This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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